Accountability of managers and long-term development of companies by Nahtigal, Matjaž
Accountability of Managers and Long-term Development of 
Companies 
Matjaz Nahtigal 
University of Primorska, Faculty of Management, Slovenia 
matjaz.nahtigal@fm-kp.si 
 
 
The present article explores the relation between the legal accountability of managers and long-term 
successful development of companies. The point of departure for the research is a claim that different 
ownership structures of the companies may lead to different behaviour of managers and therefore to 
different results of the companies. More specifically, managers can focus primarily on short-term 
positive results or long-term sustainable development of the companies partly due to different 
ownership structures of the companies. 
 
This claim is counterintuitive and it contradicts the standard model of corporate governance and 
corporate behaviour. Standard model of corporate governance claims that the ownership structure is 
largely irrelevant, because of the efficiency claim of property rights based on the Coase’s theorem.  
 
The research method is comparative corporate governance, based on classical theoretical insights 
improved with the recent experience with the mass privatization in Central and Eastern Europe and 
with the corporate failures during the financial crisis in some of the leading countries in the world. 
 
It shall be argued that balanced and diverse ownership, and a transparent and development supportive 
public framework, seem to be important elements for the behaviour of firms and their successful 
development. They are not, however, the only ingredients. Among them, high quality professional and 
well educated management must be included. High quality management is capable of competing with 
their international counterparts and has a strong sense of responsibility to shareholders, employees and 
public at large (on the long-term commitment of the firms toward sustainable development see Mayer, 
2013). This is an important element that was not sufficiently taken into account during the period of 
transition.  
 
The idea that the accountability of managers spans well beyond the responsibility to the shareholders 
is something that was well accepted in most of the advanced economies in the twentieth century. This 
idea may have been lost in the last few decades, but it may return after the crisis. In the context of 
transition and post-transition, however, the broader idea of accountability of managers to other 
stakeholders, not only shareholders, carries with it another important but little understood dimension. 
Namely, in the period of mass privatization, the alliance of dominant shareholders, privileged and 
protected insiders, managers and interest groups turned out to be a major impediment for sustainable 
and successful long-term development of firms.  
 
To overcome this impasse, a broader alliance of shareholders, more balanced and diversified, as well 
as an alliance with other stakeholders must be created. This transformation could be called a transition 
from privileged and protected rent-seekers toward a genuine development oriented society with 
balanced and well articulated interests of both the shareholders and stakeholders alike. Only then 
would the advanced and sophisticated debate on shareholders vs. stakeholders make sense for the 
transition economies and societies. 
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